Afterburner – Capability-Sandboxed JavaScript/TS Runtime in Rust
Wraps node, npm, and bun under sandbox without code changes, but Deno already does capability security.
Capability-based sandbox runtime for AI agent skills
Seccomp+iptables+mount isolation blocks the ClawdHub credential stealer in practice.
AI agent framework developers, enterprise autonomous workflows, security-conscious teams running third-party skills.
Landlock LSM · Firejail · SELinux contexts
SkillSandbox is the fix: skills declare permissions in YAML (network egress, filesystem paths, env vars), the runtime enforces via iptables default-deny, seccomp-bpf, and mount isolation. MCP server integration for Claude Code.
Also built a companion project, AgentTrace (https://github.com/theMachineClay/agenttrace), for the other failure mode: when an agent has the right permissions but does the wrong thing repeatedly. Session-aware policy engine with cumulative cost tracking, violation counting, and kill-switch.
Together: SkillSandbox constrains what agents can reach. AgentTrace enforces what agents should do.
Happy to answer questions about the architecture or threat model.
Wraps node, npm, and bun under sandbox without code changes, but Deno already does capability security.
Eight-layer governance pipeline for agents when LangChain just executes blindly.
Zero-trust governance for AI agents before they execute shell, file, or database actions with full audit trails.
Cap-std sandboxing with no-bash design is a coherent security story for agents.
IFC + capabilities block prompt injection at execution sinks, not input filters—40yr research applied.
Macaroon-style tokens for AI agents solve the excessive agency problem better than prompt engineering.